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FLORIDA'S INTERJURISDICTIONAL

CERTIFICATION

existing plans. This note has presented some of the major provisions in
present victim compensation statutes in other states. Consideration of similar
legislation for Florida demands further analysis of these provisions and other
provisions too detailed for discussion here. The innocent victim of crime
no longer can be allowed to remain a second-class citizen.
MICHAEL P. SMODISH

FLORIDA'S INTERJURISDICTIONAL CERTIFICATION: A
REEXAMINATION TO PROMOTE EXPANDED
NATIONAL USE
In 1945, Florida enacted the first enabling legislation for interjurisdictional certification, allowing federal appellate courts to certify questions of
uncertain state law to the Supreme Court of Florida.1 This first interjurisdictional certification procedure lay idle for fifteen years until the United
States Supreme Court breathed life into it by suggestion.2 As a result, the
Florida supreme court amended the Florida Appellate Rules to provide a
workable system of federal-state cooperation.3 During its dormant period,
the enabling act was noted with interest and enthusiasm by the commentators
as a possible substitute for less functional alternatives. 4 After the'amendment
of the appellate rules, and actual use of the procedure, federal judges joined
commentators in lauding certification. 5 Although used successfully in Florida

1. Fla. Stat. §25.031 (1945). "The Supreme court of this state may, by rule of court,
provide that, when it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any
circuit court of appeals of the United States, or to the court of appeals of the District 'of
Columbia, that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of
the laws of this state, which are determinative of the said cause, and there are no clear
controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state, such federal
appellate court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws of this state to the
supreme court of this state for instructions concerning such questions or propositions of'state
law, which certificate the supreme court of this state, by written opinion, may answer."
2. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960). "The Florida Legislature, with
rare foresight, has dealt with the problem of' authoritatively 'determining unresolved state
law involved in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal court to certify such
a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its decision." Id. at
212.
3. In re Florida Appellate Rules, 127 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1961). Florida Appellate Rule
4.61 was adopted pursuant to the power vested in the Florida supreme cohrt under article
V of the Florida Constitution.
4. See, e.g., Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. Riy. 629, 643-44 (1951);
Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 H.u~v. L. Rv. 1358, 1368-69
(1960); Note, Inter-Sovereign Certification as an Answer to the Abstention Problem, 21 LA.
L. Rav. 777 (1961).
5. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656, 657 (5th Cir. 1968);
Gibbs, 'How Does the Federal Judge Determine What Is the Law of the State?,"17 S.C.L,
REv. 487, 493 (1965).
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since 1961, the procedure has only been adopted by four other states: Hawaii,
Maine, New Hampshire, and Washington. 6
The cool reception given to certification is traceable to a lack of legislative and judicial definition, which created problems and criticism that have
not gone unnoticed The purpose of this note is to reexamine the Florida
certification procedure in light of eight years of varied use, discussion, and
adoption, and to propose changes that may revitalize this valuable contribution to federalism.
BASIS OF THE PROBLEM -

THE

Erie DILEMMA

In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins8 the United States Supreme Court held that
neither Congress nor the federal judiciary had the power to establish a
federal substantive common law, that power being reserved to the states by
the tenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 9 Prior to
Erie, federal courts had been free to disregard the law declared by state courts
and thus to ignore nonstatutory state policies by applying federal common law
principles.'5 With Erie, the substantive law of the states emerged as the touchstone of federal decisional law in diversity of citizenship cases."
The Court has explained and extended the Erie decision as problems
with its interpretation have arisen, 12 but a workable procedure for administering Erie has been elusive. Two basic problems that have plagued the
courts are how the federal court will ascertain the state law and what value
as precedent such federal pronouncements of state law will have. Both problems may be valuably considered in relation to an evaluation of certification.

6. Each state enacted certification enabling acts in 1965. HAWAII REV. STAT. §602.36
(1968); ME. REv. STAT. ANN, tit. 4, §57 (Supp. 1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §490: App. R.
21 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §2.60 (Supp. 1968).

7. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1968)
(Jones, J., specially concurring); Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Courts
to the Florida Supreme Court and its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L.
R~v. 413, 430-33 (1962). Professor Moore predicted the cool reception. IA J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRAGrIcE 3332, 10.309 [3] (2d ed. 1961).

8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. Id. at 78.
10. In Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938), Mr. Justice Brandeis called this the
"oft-challenged doctrine" of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). It has been suggested that Swift was dying on its own from its own inadequacies. An agonizing demise
would merely have prolonged the uncertainty of determining what law federal courts would
apply, and how. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 383, 386-88 (1964).
11. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOVA L. REV. 629, 644 (1951).
12. Among the most noted of these decisions are: Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965) (the balancing of interests test); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S.
525 (1958) (the federal countervailing considerations test); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945) (the outcome determinative test).
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AscertainingState Law
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated in the Erie decision that federal courts should
apply state law "either declared by its legislature ... or by its highest court."'1
An almost immediate erosion of this Erie guideline became necessary in order
for federal courts to comply with the mandate to apply state law. State law
had often been pronounced only at the intermediate appellate or trial court
level. In response to this problem, expansion of the sources of state law
available for consideration by federal courts began with Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Field,14 in which the Supreme Court held that a federal court must
follow a'decision by a New Jersey Court of Chancery with statewide, original
jurisdiction even though that court's decisions were not binding on state
appellate courts or even on the chancellor himself. Three companion cases
followed Field in holding state intermediate appellate court decisions to be
binding on federal courts.1 5 Lower federal courts followed Field, even to the
point of relying on state court decisions of very questionable value.26 A reaction to the possible absurdity of this trend was soon in coming. In King
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America,'1 the Supreme Court
initiated a constantly expanding trend permitting federal courts to determine
state law based on the federal court's own interpretation. 8 King focused upon
the issue of whether the circuit court of appeals had erred in refusing to
follow the decision of a South Carolina Court of Common Pleas.19 The Court
held 20 that since common pleas decisions were not binding on other South
Carolina courts, they could not bind federal courts consistent with the ruling
in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 2' that federal courts in diversity cases were
just another court of the state. The result of this new freedom for federal
judges has been to make it impossible to determine how the state law will be
ascertained. Both Field and King have coexisted and been expanded to opposite extremes of uncertainty. 22 Of course, the more obvious and most extreme difficulty arises when there is no indication of state law at any level

13. 304 U.S. at 78.
14. 311 U.S. 169, 179 (1940).
15. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six Companies v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180

(1940).
16. See, e.g., Gustin v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 154 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 866 (1946), in which an unreported decision of a court of appeals of Ohio, not
even entitled to state recognition, was followed.
17. 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
18. Gibbs, How Does the Federal Judge Determine What is the Law of the State?,
17 S.C.L. REv. 487, 491 (1965).
19. 333 U.S. at 154.
20. Id. at 157.
21. 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
22. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (decision
of state's highest court may be disregarded due to its age unless recently confirmed); Delduca
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 357 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1966) (court chose between
conflicting dicta of Florida intermediate appellate courts in its search for state law).
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of the state judiciary.23 Yet, Erie has been interpreted to require federal
court ascertainment of state law even if the states have not decided the question at all.24
DIVERSITY DECISIONS AS PRECEDENT

Closely related to the problem of ascertaining state law is what binding
effect a federal court decision based on state law will have. The function of
a legal decision is generally to decide the rights and liabilities of the particular parties and to establish precedent contributing to the body of decisional law.25 When federal courts apply state law under Erie, the second
objective cannot be realized because state courts are not bound by federal
court interpretations of state law and may ignore or disapprove them.28

If

the federal opinion is based on a decision of the highest state court, this is
not likely to occur; but it may occur at lower court levels of the state system.2 7
Federal courts have been forced to temper their decisions in recognition of
this fact, 28 and the Florida-federal relationship has presented a vivid illus-

tration of the uncertainty created by lame federal court decisions.29 The
obvious result is an inequitable application of the law and a return to forum
shopping, which Erie sought to avoid.- Attempts to alleviate these drawbacks
23. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960). Judge Friendly
said it best: "Our principal task, in this diversity . . .case, is to determine what the New
York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither
has thought."
24. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490-91 (1949); Estate of Spiegal v. Commissioner, 335
U.S. 701, 707 (1949); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
25. Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE
L. REv. 317, 323 (1967).

26. Id.
27. Duke v. Sun Oil Co., 320 F.2d 853, 858 (5th Cir. 1963). The court stated: "[W]e
are . . . conscious all the while that our decision loses authority when the first Texas
writing court declares to the contrary."
28. Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 426 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177,
179 (1933). In both cases, perpetual injunctions were imposed below against a state tax
after a finding of state law by the federal district court. The Court in each case modified
the orders to allow subsequent application for a further decree if the tax measures were
found to be valid by a state court.
29. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that general maritime law conferred no cause of action upon the personal representative of a deceased maritime employee to recover indemnity for his death, and that the action must be under Florida's
Wrongful Death Act as enforced by common law principles. Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Prod. Co., 292 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1960); Graham v. A. Lusi, Ltd., 206 F.2d 223,
225 (5th Cir. 1953). The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida, faced with the same
issue, specifically rejected the interpretation of Florida law made by the federal court.
Weed v. Bilbrey, 201 So. 2d 771, 774 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). While the Florida decision was
pending before the Florida supreme court on certiorari, the issue was certified under
FLA. App. R. 461 from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to the Florida supreme court
and was answered in conformity with the previous Fifth Circuit rulings. Moragne v. State
Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161, 167 (Fla. 1968). The Weed decision was later reversed
by the Florida supreme court. Bilbrey v. Weed, 215 So. 2d 479, 481 (Fla. 1968).
30. Gibbs, supra note 18, at 489.
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in the Erie doctrine have met with varying degrees of success and have themselves generated problems. Interjurisdictional certification is merely the latest
of these attempted solutions. Discussion of the other alternatives is necessary to further an understanding of the contributions of certification.
FEDERAL COURT ABSTENTION

As an alternative to forcing federal courts to make educated guesses on
questions of first impression in the forum state, two basic procedures have
been judicially developed by the Supreme Court and collectively labeled
"abstention."' 31 The first type of abstention is exemplified by Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co,3 2 which established the doctrine in 1941. The typical
case has been described as one in equity with an injunction being sought
against application of a state statute or administrative order on both federal
and state grounds.33 It has been the policy of federal courts not to decide
a constitutional issue unless no other alternative exists. If a state issue
exists upon which a decision may be reached, the court is under a duty to determine that law.3 4 Under Pullman, if the controlling state law is uncertain,
the federal court may hold the case in abeyance, retaining jurisdiction, and
direct the litigants to proceed through state channels to a decision on the
state issues. If the disposition in the state court system does not obviate
federal issues, the parties may return to federal court for an adjudication of
those issues.
The second type of abstention is illustrated by Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,35
and is said to be based upon "a sound respect for the independence of state
action."36 This type of abstension is generally employed in diversity cases
when no federal issue is involved and the state issue in question involves an
"aspect of sovereign prerogative,"3 7 or is "fairly open to interpretation."38

31. Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts To the Florida
Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MiAmi L. R.av. 413, 416
(1962).
32. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Texas Railroad Commission issued an administrative
order that no sleeping car could be used on any railroad in Texas unless such car was
attended by a conductor (of the white race) rather than by a porter (of the Negro race).
Plaintiff sleeping car company brought a bill in equity to enjoin the enforcement of the
order on the grounds that it violated both Texas and federal law. See also Spector Motor
Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
33. Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 1358 (1960).
34. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941). See also Albertson v.
Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 244 (1953), in which the action was commenced five days after a
state act regulating the Communist Party became law.
35. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). In a suit to enjoin enforcement of a Texas Railroad Commission order, the federal district court dismissed the complaint. The Court cited the
Pullman decision and noted the value in preventing renewal of federal-Texas conflict over
decisions in federal courts involving clearly state-oriented issues. Id. at 331-32.
36. Id. at 334.
37. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
38. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959).
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This second abstention is unlike the first in that it requires the federal court
to dismiss the suit entirely, without a retention of jurisdiction.3 9
CRITICISM OF ABSTENTION

Abstention has proved as difficult to administer as the Erie decision, which
it sought to facilitate. The United States Supreme Court has said abstention
should not extend to cases where the state law in a diversity case is merely
unclear.4o The Court has strictly limited the doctrine to the special circumstances requiring avoidance of a federal question or presenting extreme state
policy interest.41 As a practical matter, however, when the state law is uncertain neither federal court guesswork nor abstention is satisfactory. 42 Although abstention solves the problem of ascertaining state law, its disadvantages weigh heavily on the litigant, who immediately faces the question of
where to bring his suit. If the litigant is fortunate, the state may allow a petition to the highest court for a declaratory judgment; if less fortunate, he
43
must petition a lower court and face a possible appeal if he is not successful.
44
Some states, which have no Declaratory Judgment Act, would require that

the litigant repair to the court of original jurisdiction and work his way to
the highest court if necessary.4 5 The potential delay in such cases is perhaps
the greatest source of criticism of abstention, with some litigants spending
up to nine years in federal and state courts. 4r Such drawnout litigation is a
not uncommon terror of the abstention procedure.47
39. Kaplan, supra note 31, at 418. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern
Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
40. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 (1959); Meredith
v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). But see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City
of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31-38 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Albertson v. Millard, 345
U.S. 242, 245 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
41. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 489 (1949). The Court stated that in absence of
circumstances such as those in Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944),
involving the constitutionality of a state tax, or Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
309 U.S. 478 (1940), involving state law determinative of a bankruptcy matter, it would
not submit an issue to the state courts.
42. Vestal, supra note 11, at 645.
43. Kaplan, supra note 31, at 424.
44. Thirty-eight states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have adopted the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 1-2 (table of states).
45. Kaplan, supra note 31, at 424.
46. In Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944), the litigant reached
the United States Supreme Court in his suit to enjoin enforcement of a state tax provision.
The Court abstained, noting the availability of a state declaratory judgment, but retained
jurisdiction. The litigant brought action in the state courts immediately in 1944, but his
case did not come to trial until 1947. The state supreme court affirmed the state law, but
held the lower court erred in deciding federal law. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 135
Conn. 37, 40-41, 61 A.2d 89, 91-92 (1948). The litigant then returned to the United States
Supreme Court for a decision -nine
years after the litigation began. Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 868-69 (1955)
47. Agata, Delaney, Diversity, and Delay: Abstention or Abdication?, 4 Hous. L. Rav. 422
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An equally perplexing problem with which the litigant is faced is which
issues to urge in the state court. If both federal and state issues are involved,
and only the state issues are litigated in state court, the doctrine of res judicata may bar future litigation of the federal issues in the federal court retaining jurisdiction.48 The complexities of this problem alone are such as to
place it beyond the scope of this note. 49 Suffice it to say it is one of abstention's
grosser evils.
Abstention seems particularly harsh to the litigant in diversity cases if
the traditional view of that jurisdiction is accepted. The litigant is in federal
court to avoid state court bias and inequitable administration of the law; yet
he may find his case submitted to the state court for a decision on admittedly
uncertain law. If anything, the chances for inequity are magnified.50
Abstention has been vigorously attacked as being contrary to the concept
of diversity jurisdiction and the Erie decision's mandate to federal courts. 51
In recognition of these obviously valid criticisms, it has been suggested that
if abstention must be used it should be strictly limited to state issues and
used only when a declaratory judgment is available in state court.52 As a

solution to the Erie dilemma, abstention must be said to have failed because
of its own inadequacies.
INTERJURISDICrIONAL CERTIFICATION - THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE

Florida's interjurisdictional certification enabling act was designed to
alleviate the problems created by the Erie decision and abstention in our
federal system.53 It was the first act of its kind in the United States, although
the procedure is not entirely untried.54 Certification in Florida was in direct
response to the inadequacies of abstention. The enabling act was probably
a reaction to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Meredith v.
Winter Haven,55 where the Court noted the evils of abstention and refused to
(1966). The article focuses on the plight of the parties in United Service Life Ins. Co. v.
Delaney, 358 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1966). After five years the litigants received a determination of the construction of one term in an insurance contract.
48. Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1858, 1362
(1960).
49. See generally Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HAmv. L.

Rxv. 1358, 1560-68 (1960), for an in-depth treatment of the problem as it may affect the
hapless litigant.
50. Agata, supra note 47, at 435-37.
51. Id. at 433-34. The article suggests that Erie tells us how to decide diversity cases,
not who should decide them. The view is that Erie "assumed" the federal court would
decide the case. Id. at 438.
52. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 432 (1964)
(concurring opinion); East Coast Lumber Terminal, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d
106, 112 (2d Cir. 1949) (Judge Learned Hand writing for the majority).
53. FLA. STAT. §25.031 (1967). See note 1 supra.
54. England enacted two similar statutes in the 19th century to facilitate ascertainment
of foreign law when that law was controlling in conflicts problems. One statute has been
favorably utilized. Vestal, supra note 11, at 643-44.
55. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
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abstain, deciding an issue of municipal powers in Florida without the benefit
of a Florida pronouncement of the law. 56 For fifteen years following its enactment, however, the statute was unused, although marked with approval by
federal judges.57 Then in 1960, the situation anticipated by the statute arose
in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,58 where a federal question could be
avoided by a decision based on uncertain Florida law.59 After praising the
"rare foresight" of the Florida legislature, the United States Supreme Court
hurdled what might have been an obstacle to certification - the fact that no
rule of court had been promulgated to carry the act into effect. The Court
60
confidently sidestepped the problem:
It is not to be assumed, however, that such rules are a jurisdictional
requirement for the entertainment by the Florida Supreme Court of
a certificate under [Florida Statutes] §25.031.
The questions were certified by the court of appeals on August 12, 1960. On
March 1, 1961, the Florida supreme court adopted Florida Appellate Rule
4.61 and rendered its opinion on the certified questions on October 18, 1961.61
Certification had finally been utilized.
THE CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE - WHEN

To

CERTIFY

The question when to certify under a state certification procedure has
been most troublesome for federal courts. The Florida, Hawaii, Maine, and
Washington statutes and the New Hampshire court rule all provide for certification when it appears to the certifying court that there are involved in
any proceeding before it questions or propositions of the laws of the state,
which are determinative of the cause, and there are no clear controlling
precedents in the decisions of the highest court of the state. 62 The statutory

56. Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1358, 1368
n.68 (1960).
57. E.g., Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 249 F.2d 847, 854 (7th
Cir. 1957) (concurring opinion).
58. 363 U.S. 207 (1960). Petitioner, a Florida resident, sued on an Illinois insurance
contract that contained a time limitation for reporting claims. Petitioner's claim was filed
late, but the district court ruled FLA. STAT. §95.03 (1957) rendered the limitation clause
invalid, and a jury awarded petitioner $6,800 in claims. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Florida's application of its statute to an Illinois contract
was a violation of due process. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to set the stage for
use of the certification procedure.
59. The Court felt the court of appeals erred when it "assumed" Florida would apply
its statute and reached a federal constitutional question without a determination of that
fact. If Florida would not apply its statute, the federal issue would have been mooted. 363
U.S. 207, 209-11 (1960).
60. Id. at 212 n.3.
61. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 508 (1963).
62. FLA. STAT. §25.031 (1967); HAWAu REV. STAT. §602-36 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 4, §57 (Supp. 1968); N.H. REy. STAT. ANN. §490:App. R. 21 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE
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language is plain, yet the uncertainty remains. The problem has arisen because the limiting rules previously applied to federal court abstention have
been read into the statutes by some federal courts63 and commentators. 64 This
appears to be an erroneous interpretation of the statutes involved. It is
understandable that federal judges and commentators might graft the experiences of abstention to the procedure, but the danger inherent in such
a practice is that certification will not offer itself as a desirable 'alternative to
abstention, which it seeks to replace. States are understandably reluctant to
adopt a procedure that seems to offer them no advantage over the existing
limitations of abstention.
An analysis of the purpose of the statute creating -certification should
correct any erroneous interpretation. Section 25.031 of the Florida Statutes
was enacted because limiting rules were applied to abstention in Meredith
v. Winter Haven,65 depriving the state of the opportunity to decide its own
law. In view of this fact, and the plain language of the statute, it is obvious
that certification is an alternative to abstention - not a companion to it. It
should be further recognized that certification is a statutory procedure, not a
judge-made rule as is abstention. 66 Its scope is therefore delineated withinthe four corners of the statute, which is explicit as to when to certify. A final
consideration is that in certification the state has provided the procedure not the federal courts.67 Thus, if a federal court elects to certify, 68 it need
only follow the "plain meaning" of the statutory language. It will be for
the state's highest, court to interpret its statute and accept or reject the certificate. It has even been suggested by a Supreme Court justice that by overrestricting abstention the federal courts would encourage the states to adopt

ANN.

§2.60.020 (Supp. 1968). The Washington statute provides for certification when the

local law "has not been clearly determined." Thus, perhaps the lack of a decision by the
highest court of the state is not required under the Washington procedure.
63. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 601, 602 n.1
(5th Cir. 1967), "where the issue was neither intricate nor repetitive enough to warrant a
Clay-type referral to the Supreme Court of Florida."
64. Kaplan, supra note 31, at 433. "[I]t must be remembered that this procedure can
be used only in those cases which require the operation of abstention and not in all cases
involving issues of uncertain state law." See also McKusick, Certification: A Procedure for
Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts, 16 U. ML.L. RaV. 33, 40 (1964).

65. 320 Us. 228, 234 (1943).
66. The abstention procedure originated in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941).
67. It is generally agreed that a federal court cannot compel a state court to answer
certified questions. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
US. 411, 434 (1964) (concurring opinion). "We cannot require the States to provide such a
procedure .... See also Agata, supra note 47, at 445. But see Wright, supra note 25, at
325; Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1358, 1369

(1960).
68. FLA. AP. R. 4.61 (c) (1962). "The provisions of this rule may be invoked by any
of the federal courts . . .upon its own motion or upon the suggestion or motion of any
interested party when approved by such federal court." New Hampshire's court rule is
substantially the same. On occasion, federal courts have refused to certify what appear to
be eligible issues. Greer v. Associated Indem. Corp., 371 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1967).
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certification.69 The implication is that certification must fulfill the state law
requirements of Erie where abstention has been overly restrictive and has
failed to do so. If those same restrictions are transferred to certification, the
impossibility of an extensive acceptance of certification is apparent.
WHAT COURT MAY CERTIFY

Florida Statutes, section 25.031, allows certification by the federal appellate courts, but not by the district courts. Hawaii similarly limits its
procedure.70 When Florida adopted certification, it was feared that to permit
certification from the federal district courts would result in over-crowded
dockets.71 Since Florida was the first to experiment with certification, it was
perhaps best to test its validity and administrative ease under a lighter case72
load situation. When a certification procedure was proposed in Maine,
it was modeled after that of Florida, but with the addition of district court
certification. The problem of crowded dockets was felt not to exist in that
state.7 3 Washington also allows district court certification, and its supreme
court has indicated that the value of the procedure far outweighs any crowded
docket problems.74 The New Hampshire court rule provides for district
court certification, but the rule appears never to have been utilized. In light
of the successful use of certification in Florida under its present system,
Florida, as the innovator state, should not fail to evaluate the possibilities
of extending its own procedure to the district courts. 5 The arguments for
and against such an extension may be profitably considered at this point.
DISTRICT COURT CERTIFICATION

One commentator has listed reasons for not allowing district court certification as follows: such procedure is not in accord with generally accepted
federal-state relationships; dockets would be clogged by the procedure; there
will not have been a finding of fact by the district court; and the appellate
court accepting certification is not a factfinding tribunal.6 To these may be
69. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 434 (1964)
(Justice Douglas, concurring). "[B]y asserting the independence of the federal courts and
insisting on prompt adjudications we will encourage its use."
70. Hawaii adopted FLA. STAT. §25.031, verbatim. HAWAii RaV. STAT. §602-36 (1968).
71. McKusick, supra note 64, at 41.
72. Id. at 40-42. The proposed statute and rules were adopted by the Maine Legislature substantially as suggested.
73. The prediction has proved to be true. In three years only three questions have
been certified by the United States District Court for the District of Maine. Letter from
Honorable Edward T. Gignoux, Judge United States District Court, Portland, Maine,
to Christy F. Harris, April 3, 1969.
74. In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 350 (Wash. 1968).
75. Under the present system, it does not appear that the availability of district court
certification would appreciably increase the caseload of certified questions in Florida. Even
if it did, the Washington court's attitude seems worthy of adoption.
76. Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification as an Answer to the Abstention Problem,
21 LA. L. REV. 777, 780 (1961).
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added the impracticality of interrupting a jury trial in order to certify a state
law question, and the fact that at the appellate level briefs are occasionally
required to determine the advisability of certification.77
In answer to these propositions it may be said first that a new and valuable
means of implementing federal-state cooperation should not be impeded
merely because it implies a new concept of federal-state relations. The
flexibility of the federal system must qualify as its best feature. Second,
dockets may or may not be overcrowded, as the Florida and Maine experiences have shown. Each state must weigh the conflicting interests involved in
its own circumstances. The question of factfinding is not as easily resolved,
but a consideration of some practical realities based on experience only
recently available may answer the problem. Maine, one state with district
court certification, has compared its procedure with that envisioned by the
Declaratory Judgment Act.7 8 The problems posed concerning factfinding
are similar3 9 As in the case of a declaratory judgment action, the certificate
must provide "a statement of facts showing the nature of the case, and the
circumstances out of which the question of law arises ... ."80 It is conceivable
that such a statement of facts could be completely disputed and make it impossible to render a dispositive determination of the law. Such a situation
has occurred, and led to Maine's refusal to answer a certificate.8 1 Such a situation will not always exist as, for example, when the facts are not in disputes2
or can be stipulated. Washington, the second state with district court certification, would seem to require a "certified agreed statement of facts" to
eliminate the problem entirely.83 It is also possible that the facts will have
been found by the district court prior to its certification of the question of
state law, as when the certificate comes on a motion for a new trial, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.8 4 This admitted problem of a lack of sufficient fact basis for certification arises in some instances, but has not been considered serious enough to forbid district court certification in Maine. Admittedly, the presence of a jury makes it impractical to interrupt the actual
trial for certification. However, just as it is possible to certify after the trial, it is
more likely that certification will be agreed on by counsel at the pretrial conference in an atmosphere of cooperation between judge and counsel. 85 If the
judge felt argument on the matter was necessary, it could be presented at a
motions hearing. In short, the prospect of extending Florida's certification pro-

77.

See, e.g., Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 344 Fg2d 930, 931 (5th Cir. 1965).

78. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 830 (Me. 1966).
79. Id.
80. ME.

R. CiV. PRO. 76 B (b).
81. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me. 1966).
82. Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248, 250 (Me. 1966).
83. In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 354 (WVash. 1968).
84. Although this has never occurred, District Judge Gignoux, who has certified three
questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, suggests that he would certify on a
motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Letter, note 73 supra.
85. All three questions certified by the United States District Court for the District of
Maine were agreed upon at the pretrial conference. Id.
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United States district courts should not be overlooked. Such an
would allow certification to be available in all instances when
is possible, thus better replacing it. A weighing of interests will
advisability of district court certification in each state.
THE STATE CONSTITUTION - A BAR

To

CERTIFICATION

The constitutionality of a state's certification procedure must be determined by each state. In Florida, the issue was considered and disposed of, sua
sponte by the Florida supreme court in conjunction with its first opinion
under the procedure. 6 The court felt the issue turned on the question
whether article V, section 4, of the Florida Constitution prohibited judiciary
powers beyond those expressly authorized. The court held that Florida
Statutes, section 25.031, was a valid enlargement of the judicial power since it
did not diminish the constitutional jurisdiction of any other court and was
not expressly forbidden by the constitutionYs7 Florida's new constitution has
not altered the judicial article and should not affect these earlier findings of
constitutionality.-s
When the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine received its second certified
question,8 9 pursuant to its enabling statute9" and procedural rules,91 the
court was forced to answer a motion to dismiss the certificate on the ground
it violated the constitution of Maine. Citing Florida's decision on the constitutionality of certification, the court held the procedure did not call for
an advisory opinion (which the Maine court could not give), and that certification was a valid judicial power under article VI, section 3, of the constitution of Maine. 92 The Washington supreme court drew upon the Florida
experience in holding that its legislature could enlarge the judicial power.
The court further held that the enabling act was "permissive," not mandatory, thus allowing the court to avoid any unconstitutional application
93
through judicial self-restraint.

86. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 739-40 (Fla. 1961). The court requested
briefs from the parties and amicus curiae to determine the constitutionality of entertaining
certified questions.
87. Id. at 741-42. The court cited Pournelle v. Baxter, 142 Fla. 517, 195 So. 163 (1940),
for this proposition.
88. Compare FLA. CONST. art. V (1885), with FLA. CONST. art. V (1968).
89. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966). Three certificates have reached the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine since enactment of the Maine statute. Letter note 73
supra. See also Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966); In the latest case, Pierce v.
Secretary, Civil No. 10-61 (D. Me. 1969), Judge Gignoux entered summary judgment for
the defendant after the Supreme Judicial Court answered in the negative the question
whether common law marriages were valid in Maine. Letter from Honorable Edward T.
Gignoux, Judge, United States District Court, Portland Maine, to Christy F. Harris, July
24, 1969.
90. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §57 (Supp. 1968).
91. ME. R. CIv. PRO. 768.

92. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 832 (Me. 1966).
93. In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347, 351-54 (Wash. 1968).
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PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS

Insuring a JusticiableControversy
The future acceptance of certification by any large number of states will
depend on how well the procedure stands up to state constitutional requirements. The justiciability requirements of the states vary, and these are the
major obstacles to the introduction of any new judicial procedure. In the
case of certification, the justiciability question may be phrased in terms of
whether the state court's decision of a certified question is in the nature of an
advisory opinion with no binding effect, or is dispositive of real legal issues
founded in a justiciable controversy, having the binding force, of law. A majority of the states will respond to a controversy only if their judgment will
9
be res judicata and a stare decisis adjudication of state rights involved. 4
Only a handful of states allow advisory opinions, and then only of a limited
nature.95 A closer look at the experience of certification will establish as unfounded the reluctance of some states and encourage more widespread adoption of certification.
It appears that some federal judges and commentators have erroneously
attributed the qualities of an advisory opinion to certification proceedings. 96
This is attributable at least in part to a lack of definition given the procedure
by the Florida supreme court in drafting facilitating rules97 and in rendering
decisions on certified questions. 98 A comparison of the advisory opinion procedure with that visualized by the certification procedure should clearly separate and define the two.99

94. Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative
JudicialFederalism, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 356 (1963).
95. Stevens, Advisory Opinions-Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L. REv.
1 n.2 (1959). In Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Dakota the procedure is allowed
under certain circumstances.
96. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1968)
(special concurring opinion); Kaplan, supra note 31, at 432, which states "The Supreme
Court of Florida ... renders only an advisory opinion to the federal judiciary."
97. FLA. App. R. 4.61; Ma. R. Civ. PRO. 76B; N.H. App. R. 21. In each case there is
no mention of whether the court has jurisdiction over the parties or whether the court's
decision has binding effect on either the parties or in future litigation.
98. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170-71 (Fla. 1963). Certified question from a federal court diversity case, 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), wherein the plaintiff
wife sued for damages for her husband's death, allegedly caused by the defendant's cigarettes. The theory of recovery was breach of implied warranty. The.defense was lack of
knowledge of the harmful effect of cigarettes. The Florida supreme court refused to
decide the question of ultimate liability under the facts, or even the scope of the liability.
It merely answered in the abstract a hypothetical question whether knowledge was relevant
to liability under the theory of implied warranty in Florida.
99. The Washington supreme court seems to have rendered such a distinction unnecessary in that state. Although the court concluded the certification statute did not call for
an advisory opinion, it said in dictum that it had the inherent power to render such an
opinion even if it was merely advisory. In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 358 (Wash. 1968).
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It has been observed that an advisory opinion generally lacks the following elements of a justiciable controversy: the legal issue or proposition is
formed in the abstract and answered in the abstract; there is a conspicuous
absence of a concrete factual situation to aid in the formulation of the ultimate issue; the proceeding is ex parte, lacking the aid of counsel in an adversary proceeding; there are no parties to the litigation whose private rights
will be affected; and there is no binding, res judicata determination of rights
and liabilities based on an existing controversy. 100 By comparison, the certification procedure envisions a question of law framed in an actual factual
situation to avoid the problem of abstraction. Maine and Washington have
best exemplified this in their rules of procedure' 1 and the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine has manifested its intention to be strict in actual practice by
refusing to accept a certified question when the facts were disputed and would
have required an abstract answer.1 0 2 Florida's rule reads as I'Iaine's, but in practice Florida has been less strict in its insistence on compliance.10 3 By its
action the Maine court has given needed definition to the certification procedure, from which Florida might profit.
Florida, Maine, New Hampshire, and Washington have provided for presentation of briefs and oral arguments to add the adversary element of counsel
to certification.104 It is said that what might otherwise be called an advisory
opinion "takes on the character of a declaratory judgment" when actual disputes are argued by adverse parties.1° 5 In no sense, then, can a certification

proceeding be considered ex parte. The parties to the federal litigation are the
parties to the certification proceedings, and it is unquestionable that their
private rights may be affected by the decision of the state court. In Florida,
Maine, New Hampshire, and Washington the parties are classified as appellant and appellee and present their arguments to the state's highest court
according to the rules of appeal. 0 6 The adversary atmosphere is maintained.
Certificationand the Problem of Precedent
Whether a decision pursuant to a certified question is binding law is less
easily determined than the issue of justiciability. The state court's decision
as to the state law involved should be law of the case and res judicata as to
the parties, and binding precedent within the state. It is the "law of the

100. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 46, at 78-79; Stevens, supra note 95, at 8.
Both discuss generally the quality of advisory opinions.
101. ME. R. CIv. PRO. 76B(b). "The certificate ... shall contain . . . a statement of
facts showing the nature of the case and the circumstances out of which the question of
law arises ...." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §2.60.010(4) (Supp. 1968), requires a "stipulation
of facts approved by the federal court."
102.

In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me. 1966).

103. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
104. FLA. App. R. 4.61 (g); ME. R. CIv. PRO. 76B (b).
105. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 46, at 81.
106. FLA. Ap. R. 4.61 (g), (h); ME. R. CiV. PRO. 76B (e); N.H. App. R. 21 (b);
REV. COnE ANN. §2,60.030 (4), (5) (Supp. 1968).
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case" that controls the relationship of the trial and appellate courts in each
individual litigation. Thus, it is this concept that dictates that the certifying
federal court should be bound by the decision of the state court accepting the
certificate on points of state law. Until the particular litigation has ended, it
is this concept alone that governs the binding effect of the state court's determination of state law. "Res judicata" becomes important when and if
the parties become involved in a collateral suit. It is this concept that governs
the relationship of the parties and precludes reconsideration of the state
court's answers to issues certified from federal court when, for instance, they
initiate a subsequent suit in the state courts. Finally, it is the doctrine of
"stare decisis" that produces a point or points of binding law controlling
upon all state courts in all suits where the issue arises that was decided on
certification. 07 Commentaries and decisions often appear to confuse or neglect these distinctions. All three concepts should be separately recognized to
give binding effect to answers to certificates in their separate spheres, while
combining to produce "binding law" on the over-all scheme. Both federalLos
and state1 09 courts have held that the law pronounced by the state court is
binding under the doctrine of stare decisis and under Erie. Again, Maine
has added the needed definition to the certification procedure, which is
necessary to its successful continuation: 110
This Court will treat that judgment on legal issues as having the force
of decided case law within the courts of this state and as res judicata
in our state.
Abstention places the parties before the state court, and they are bound
by its decisions, which are res judicata and binding under stare decisis. It is
only logical that certification proceedings should provide the same sure decisional law in order to qualify as a valid alternative to abstention. It is
107. In Florida, the "law of the case" is defined as "the principle that the questions
of law decided on appeal to a court of ultimate resort must govern the case in the same
court and the trial court, through all subsequent stages of the proceedings, and will seldom
be reconsidered or reversed, even though they appear to have been erroneous." "Res judicata" is a less limited term defined as the principle that "a point which was actually and
directly in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed upon by a domestic court
of competent jurisdiction, cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between
the same parties or their privies, whether the cause of action in the two suits be identical
or different; and . . . a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, on the
merits, is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same
cause of action, so long as it remains unreversed." The broadest concept is "stare decisis
... a maxim to the effect that, when a point of law has been settled by decision, it forms
a precedent which is not afterwards to be departed from." McGregor v. Provident Trust
Co., 119 Fla. 718, 162 So. 323, 327-28 (1935).

108. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656, 657 (5th Cir. 198).
"It is the Florida law binding on us as we perform our Erie role." But see concurring
opinion at 658.
109. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 832 (Me. 1966).
110. Id. The Supreme Court of Washington has adopted the Maine rationale. In re
Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 355 (Wash. 1968),
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unfortunate that any other interpretation has appeared. It is fortunate the
Maine and Washington courts have avoided these interpretations.
Certification in FederalQuestion Cases
The question remaining unsettled is whether the federal courts should
certify questions of state law when federal questions are also posed by the
controversy. Florida allows such certification in litigation dealing with a
federal question,"' even though its decision on the state law may not be
decisive of the entire controversy. 1 2 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
seems to have adopted a contrary position by declining to answer a certificate
when its decision would not have been dispositive of the cause, and the
Supreme Court of Washington seems to agree with the Maine court. 1 3 The
better position would require that the state court decide the state questions if
they meet the previously outlined requirements, even if ultimate disposition
may be based on a federal question. Any other result would require that
abstention continue to be used where both federal and state issues are involved. This is undesirable if certification is to offer itself as a complete
alternative to abstention, as it might valuably do.
CONCLUSION

Florida's certification procedure has been successfully used on numerous
occasions by federal courts." 4 This is indicative of the desire of federal courts

to cooperate with the states in this admittedly complex area of the federal
system as defined by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. Four other states have adopted
certification, but only Maine and Washington appear to have utilized the
procedure.115 The reluctance of other states to accept certification is due to
a combination of state constitutional prohibitions and lack of definition in
the certification procedure as enacted by the pioneer states." 6 Maine has gone

11.

Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S.
179 (1964). The court decided the question on federal constitutional grounds after receipt of the Florida supreme court's answer to a certificate concerning state issues.
113. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me. 1966); In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 358
(Wash. 1968).
114. See, e.g., Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963); Aldrich v. Aldrich,
375 U.S. 75 (1963); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968); Sun
Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304
F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
115. Hawaii appears to have only its enabling act. HAWAII Rrv. STAT. §602-36 (1968).
New Hampshire adopted its court rule without an enabling act or legislative approval, but
appears not to have utilized the procedure. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §390:App. R. 21 (1968).
116. See, e.g., United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965). The
majority and a minority of three judges argued the constitutionality of giving a declaratory
judgment under circumstances that would suggest certification. The majority suggested a
certified question procedure, but felt a constitutional amendment would be required. Id.
at 864. See also United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 277 Ala. 612, 173 So. 2d 777
112.
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far in expanding and defining certification, and the Florida supreme court
should follow that state's lead in establishing certification as a truly valuable
method of implementing federal-state cooperation under Erie.
It is suggested that the Florida supreme court amend the Florida Appellate
Rules to provide that the parties to a certification proceeding shall be before
the court and subject to its jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the issues
of state law certified. In this way the appellate nature of the proceeding will
be emphasized, and the resulting decision will be the law of case, res judicata,
and binding state law. The Florida supreme court should further require
strict compliance with its amended provisions and avoid answering certificates
that involve abstract questions of law. The federal courts could aid in the
process of redefining certification by setting out rules under which certified
questions would be prepared and placed in a sufficient factual circumstance
so as to avoid abstraction. The American Law Institute has suggested that
title 28 of the United States Code be amended to authorize federal court
certification, but the amendment merely encourages federal courts to utilize
preexisting state procedures. The institute raises and briefly treats some of
the problems heretofore discussed, but seems to indicate that it will be left for
the states to cure the defects in the present certification procedure."17 Nor
is the proposal intended to force state courts to adopt the procedure or alter
existing procedure.""" No doubt the institute's proposals can be viewed as an
endorsement of the procedure and, in view of suggestions from various
quarters that federal court diversity jurisdiction be abolished,'-9 it is time
that advocates of Erie, diversity, and certification concentrate their efforts in
the interest of our federal system and the individual litigant, who has suffered too long at the hands of abstention.
CRusTY F. HARMus

(1965); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961), where
state supreme courts appeared willing to cooperate with federal courts, but questioned
the constitutionality of such cooperation.
117. See ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BrWEEN STATE AND FJ DERAL
COURTS §1371 (e) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968), and valuable commentary thereon, which raises
some problems in discussing chronologically the history and prior use of certification by
the states.
118. Id., Commentary §1371 (3), at 216.
119. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1968)
(concurring opinion). "The opinion of the court well demonstrates the desirability of

abolishing diversity jurisdiction of fedcr! courts."
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